Official – Complexity Does Not Prove ID

From Neurologica today I read this quote from creationist Michael Egnor writing in the creationist Discovery Institute’s website:

Complexity can arise without intelligent design, but complexity is not the same thing as design.

Huu-whaaaaa? He clearly didn’t run that by Michael Behe. Because, according to Behe, and virtually all other ID proponents, complexity is the one thing you can use to determine design. That has been their entire argument – life is “too complex” to have arisen without a designer. Now Egnor, writing in the Discovery Institute’s own paper, states clearly that this is not true. And I didn’t take it out of context – read the whole thing. Finally, Egnor says something sensible. Although one wonders how such a blunder was allowed to slip in.

I’m bookmarking that page for the next time some creationist insists life is “too complex” to have arisen without a designer.  “Complexity can arise without intelligent design” – official, The Discovery Institute.

Comments

[Bob Airhart]

Someone ought to preserve a copy of the full article accessible somewhere on the web other than a skeptic's blog. No doubt when they realize what they have done they will try to make it go away, say it never existed, that the skeptics made it up and that they twisted it out of context.

I wonder, does this blunder become evidence of the lack of intelligent design (I know, that was nasty, but not beneath me.)

[Alt Numlock]

Your post is simply grasping at straws. Comical.

[Techskeptic]

No that I'm defending Behe's point of view, I think it is also nonsense. But I think his deal is with irreducable complexity, not complexity itself.

[King of Ferrets]

One of the best IDiot quotes I've seen so far.

[Joseph]

Is God irreducibly complex in ID, or is he in a separate category altogether?

The irreducible complexity argument is clearly a loser. You first have to prove living beings are irreducibly complex, which has been tried, but obviously can't be done.

I thin Behe thinks he HAS proven that vrious things are irreducibly complex. For this he give examples of the eye and flagellum. both of which have been debunked now.

The problem with any of their arguments is not the idea, but the assumption of God.

For example, if he did find something irreducibly complex, then he would actually have a case. Wouldn't he? I dont mean thing that are easy to debunk, like the eye example. I mean something like a metal skeletal structure. or something like that.

Or would we continue to look for natural ways for something like that to occur?

[King of Ferrets]

For example, if he did find something irreducibly complex, then he would actually have a case. Wouldn't he? I dont mean thing that are easy to debunk, like the eye example. I mean something like a metal skeletal structure. or something like that.

He has a case until someone debunks it. If we can't find a way to debunk it ever, they have a case that will stand forever.

[Akusai]

Behe can find IC forever and a day and it won't matter because irreducible complexity can evolve. Even though we can debunk some supposedly IC structures and say "That's not really irreducibly complex," even if he found something that was IC by his own definition, it would prove absolutely nothing. Evolution can remove parts as well as add them, thus IC is perfectly evolvable. Design is completely unnecessary.

If we can't find a way to debunk it ever, they have a case that will stand forever.

We don't even have to debunk specific cases, because since IC is evolvable, we've debunked the whole mess at an even higher level.

Moreover, I would argue that his ideas are the problem because (1)they are tied intrinsically to his god assumption, and (2)they are scientifically useless. Saying "That's IC!" does as much for biology as defining a certaing type of structure as "flugastic." It adds nothing to science whatsoever. The idea of IC exists only so someone can say "That is IC, therefore God."

It makes about as much sense as saying "That is flugastic, therefore flarshnikit."

[Joseph]

If you combine ID with an omnipotent god, it seems you'd also have a problem. Nothing can be irreducibly complex if there's an omnipotent being that could reduce it if he wanted to.

[Tom S. Fox]

Your post is simply grasping at straws. Comical.

Yes, the creationists are trashing their one and only "argument" if you can call it one and he is grasping at straws...
Way to turn around the facts!
Comical.

By the way, irreducible complexity is a prediction of Evolution, which means that it is evidence for Evolution!
So look for irreducible complex systems all you want, you are just providing evidence for Evolution!

Oh, one more thing: Ìsn't it possible to bring the page back using the Wayback Machine in case they remove it?

[Techskeptic]

Akusai,

that was a very good point (in my eyes at least) that I had not read before. I think I had a Flugasm reading it.

Tom,
Yes wayback machine should be able to take care of archives, but it may be unreliable becuase it doesnt record every page of every site every day.

When you say Irreducible Compexity is a prediction of evolution, did you mean in the way that Akusai discusses, or in another capacity? honestly, I had not heard that before,while of course I heard of deletions before. What it says to me is that becuase deletions happen, we have no good way to detect true irreducible complexity. It just ends up meaning that we don't know the steps that a creature took to get to a certain state, but we assume it got there.

I can magine why that doesnt st well with god bots. By "assume" I mean we have seen deletions, we have seen a multitude of mechanisms by which an organism evolves, just becuase we missed a few steps and can't back track, doesnt mean its time to bring inthe sky daddy, we just presume that the missing steps are there, whether we know what they are or not.

right?

[Croath]

Next time before you embarrass yourselves you might want to take a few minutes out of your busy day of bringing "rationality" to the world and actually try to understand what you are criticising.

If you'd cared to look, you would learn that Intelligent Design proponents do not make the simple claim that complexity is evidence of design. They say that *specified* complexity is evidence of design. If you have wind blowing leaves from a tree and scattering them on the ground, you have an undesigned complex pattern. If you have a child spell their name with the leaves you have a specified complex pattern.

I don't think you'll see the Discovery Institute hurry to delete an article that's only problem is your lack of understanding.

[Tom Foss]

Croath:

If you'd cared to look, you would learn that Intelligent Design proponents do not make the simple claim that complexity is evidence of design.

On the contrary, I have seen many make that claim. Here, for instance. The whole of ID is built upon variants of the "X is so complex that it could not have evolved" argument from personal ignorance.

They say that *specified* complexity is evidence of design.

Ah. And how do we measure that? Can you even give a useful definition of what specified complexity is?

If you have wind blowing leaves from a tree and scattering them on the ground, you have an undesigned complex pattern. If you have a child spell their name with the leaves you have a specified complex pattern.

And here it sounds like you're making the same categorical error that the vast majority of IDists make: claiming that there is some quality inherent to "designed" objects which objectively and individually sets them apart from non-designed objects. There isn't. We distinguish "design" from "non-design" by comparison. Things that have been designed by intelligent agents tend to differ noticeably from the natural surroundings in which they are found. It's why Paley's watch lying next to the stream in the woods sticks out, while the deer drinking downstream doesn't.

Techskeptic and others: I think this discussion might benefit from the definition of Irreducible Complexity as used by the IDists. All they use it to mean is that you have some structure where, if you remove any one of its many parts, the structure no longer functions. Since "half a wing" or "half an eye" is no good, these structures could not have evolved, and must have been designed.

As you all already know, what scientists have found is that IDists are, as usual, full of it. The paths to "irreducible complexity" are myriad. In the case of many things, as has been noted, physical structures may evolve over time, then disappear over time once they are no longer useful; the usual analogy is to scaffolding, which is taken down once the building is finished, leaving a structure that could not have been built on its own.

In the case of the eye, what we have is more of a general trend toward greater precision. An eye which sees half as well as a modern eye is, in fact, better than no eye at all. And we can trace the development of the eye by looking at various species with eyes that fall all along the developmental spectrum.

The other ID favorite example, the bacterial flagellum, is a different sort. With the eye, when you take away parts, you end up with a less functional (but still beneficial) organ. With the flagellum, when you take away certain parts, you end up with a perfectly functional organ which performs a somewhat different function. The other path toward "irreducible complexity" results from the attribution of purpose to biological features, and a flawed assumption that that function must have always been the function of that feature. What happens fairly often in biology is that structures with one function get appropriated and modified into structures with significantly different functions, by only adding a few parts. Again, with this, we can trace the development by examining similar species with differently functioning organs.

Something like a metal skeleton wouldn't necessarily be irreducible complexity in the ID definition, it would (potentially) be a biological feature that had no known physiological cause or origin. Basically, the X-Men would be excellent evidence for some sort of design, since (as far as I know) there is no known physical or physiological mechanism which could even be expressed by genes (let alone acted upon by mutation and natural selection) that would allow a person to control the weather or teleport in space.

If we came across animals with biological features that clearly defied known physical laws and the limitations of gene expression, then we might give some serious consideration to the ID/Creationist hypothesis; it wouldn't necessarily mean an immediate rejection of evolution, but if we couldn't figure out the mechanism which allowed the gun-wolf's biological weaponry to be expressed and modified over time through heredity, then we'd have to give some real thought to overhauling the paradigm.

Also, we'd be a hell of a lot more careful outside. A wolf with guns growing out of it? Now that's scary.

[Croath]

Tom Foss,

On the contrary, I have seen many make that claim. Here, for instance. The whole of ID is built upon variants of the "X is so complex that it could not have evolved" argument from personal ignorance.

You have read both my statement, and that of the person you linked to, uncharitably. You could have reasonably taken my claim to be refering to those qualified to represent Intelligent Design - such as the Discovery Institute. Instead you thought I was speaking on behalf of every internet poster with an opinion favourable to ID. I'm sure there's some people who assert ridiculous things in the name of Darwinism, but I wouldn't uncharitably associate you with making their claims, or count them as being representative. I would correct them and point out how they're not actually representing the best modern thought on the subject. You should, when debating, give your opponent charity in taking what the strongest claim of theirs could be - that way you stop picking around the edges and can get straight to the heart of the matter to see who is right.

Also, the person you linked to spoke of "biological complexity". He was *very* specific about the complexity he was referring to, not just any complexity we find in the world. I don't see anything in is his post, at a glance, that requires us to think that he meant complexity in general is evidence of design.

You also have a simplistic and immature understanding of the Intelligent Design claims. It is not simply that "it could not have evolved". It goes much deeper than that - but I will leave that for another time to keep this conversation more focussed.

Ah. And how do we measure that? Can you even give a useful definition of what specified complexity is?

I didn't claim to be able to explain precisely what specified complexity is. I was just pointing out that ID proponents (those who well represent it) distinguish between just general complexity and specified complexity. Whether there are issues with specified complexity, or in making this distinction, is an independent question.

And my answer would be that given that specified complexity refers to complexity that is meaningful to a mind, it is going to be difficult - if not impossible - to pin down an exact definition that will allow us to perfectly distinguish. Two points:
1. Being unable to pin down the definition exactly doesn't make it useless. We have plenty of phrases that defy a precise definition yet are still profoundly useful. I might refer to a "pile of sand", but then we might wonder how much sand is required to make something a pile? So too, there are clear cut cases where complexity is specified and where it is not.
2. Dembski's methods were never intended to distinguish perfectly between all cases of design and non-design. It was merely meant to be reliable when it does assert the presence of design. Plenty of design might slip through the net though. Plenty of cases of specified complexity might remain undetected. It was never claimed to be more than that.

And here it sounds like you're making the same categorical error that the vast majority of IDists make: claiming that there is some quality inherent to "designed" objects which objectively and individually sets them apart from non-designed objects. There isn't.

I didn't claim it was anything inherent in the objects themselves. A painting might be beautiful. That doesn't mean the beauty is in the paint, the canvas, the frame or any of the matter it's composed out of. The beauty exists in the mind of the observer to whom that arrangement of matter is meaningful. This is what we are trying to detect - purposeful arrangement of matter by a mind. Not some inherent quality in the objects themselves.

We distinguish "design" from "non-design" by comparison. Things that have been designed by intelligent agents tend to differ noticeably from the natural surroundings in which they are found.

And how is that a refutation of anything I claimed? How does this highlight any supposed categorical error you think I've made?

This is not the only way we distinguish design from non-design. That's just one way. ID doesn't claim to have *the* only way of detecting design, just one way, and an imperfect way. When it detects design, it will always be correct - but sometimes it won't detect design when in fact there is design. Other methods might help in different scenarios.

It's why Paley's watch lying next to the stream in the woods sticks out, while the deer drinking downstream doesn't.

I have no idea what your point is here. Are you meaning to beg the question, by supposing that the deer is not designed? This is the very question we are discussing. You can't point to the deer as not designed, and expect me to say, "of course!" I look at the deer and see design. I distinguish between the deer and a rock, not the deer and a watch, where design is concerned. Even Richard Dawkins sees the appearance of design in nature - don't you?

In fact, your analogy is *extremely* poor. Suppose that the watch is designed by the watchmaker Frank from town. Suppose also that the deer is designed by God. We have here the deer in an environment designed by God - the grass, trees, flowers, insects, and so on. And then we have the watch - designed and built by Frank. It stands out not because one is designed and the other is not - rather because they have two different designers with different styles and intentions.

An analogy of this would be a server room full of computers, cables, air conditioners, etc - and then a toilet right in the middle of it. The toilet doesn't stand out because it alone was designed - but rather because it is out of place in the style and intention of the design - indeed even in the precision and complexity.

The main point here is that your analogy doesn't beget only one explanation, and doesn't support your conclusion.

[Techskeptic]

Tom:

Yes, I think we are all on the same page. I just had not really connected genetic deletions to irreducible complexity before, even though I was quite familiar with both concepts. Makes perfect sense.

Croath,

I am damn sure Tom will chime in with a far more complete response, and more eloquent than I, so I will wait for that. I just had a few little questions:

I distinguish between the deer and a rock, not the deer and a watch, where design is concerned.

Why? Why is that the comparison you would make? Why isnt the rock just as designed as the deer? Because the deer has moving parts? So do clouds and lava. The watch and the deer are the things you should be comparing because of what is common to the surroundings. Becuase one is more complex? What about a dinner plate? A deer certainly is more complex than a dinner plate, but you would examine the deer for design before the dinner plate?

The things you choose to distinguish make have no rhyme or reason to it.

Suppose that the watch is designed by the watchmaker Frank from town. Suppose also that the deer is designed by God. We have here the deer in an environment designed by God - the grass, trees, flowers, insects, and so on. And then we have the watch - designed and built by Frank.

Difference is that I can go ask frank if he made the watch. Not only can he answer it, he can show me how, show me which parts to use.

Now let me ask God: "God, did you make all the deer, the grass, the flowers, the insects, and so on?"

sorry I don't speak cricket. Perhaps you do, when God give you assembly instructions, I'd like to see them. I've been through the bible, there are no assembly instructions for a deer in there.

Further, even if it was not frank, I know that watchmakers exist, There is plenty of evidence(I can't believe creationists haven't gotten past the watchmaker analogy after 150 years)... Aww screw it I'm not arguing paleys watchmaker argument, that stupid argument has been through the wringer for 150 years, its dead and gets more idiotic every time it gets brought up.

Same with toilet in a server room. What an enlightened rehash of Paley's watchmaker. [sarcasm]. I can go to a toilet manufacturer and see toilets being made. I can go to a computer manufacturer and see computers being made (they even will have toilets there).

Both places have tons of documentation and people to talk to to find out how things were made.

The supposition "Toilets were made by man" has tons of traceable, repeatable, measurable, evidence. The supposition "God made deer" has only faith.

[Techskeptic]

awww shit. sorry about the html.

[Techskeptic]

lol... ok i'll close it now

[Martin]

Tech:

"I am damn sure Tom will chime in with a far more complete response..."

http://xkcd.com/406/

;)

[Tom Foss]

You have read both my statement, and that of the person you linked to, uncharitably. You could have reasonably taken my claim to be refering to those qualified to represent Intelligent Design - such as the Discovery Institute. Instead you thought I was speaking on behalf of every internet poster with an opinion favourable to ID.

Ah, yes, I should have known that Bill Dembski, Discovery Institute fellow and major league ID proponent, would let totally unqualified people write guest posts about Intelligent Design on his blog about Intelligent Design, without correcting them. Silly me.

You should, when debating, give your opponent charity in taking what the strongest claim of theirs could be - that way you stop picking around the edges and can get straight to the heart of the matter to see who is right.

Well, hell, if we're getting straight to the heart of the matter, why don't we look at the evidence. IDies first.

You made an absolute claim ("Intelligent Design proponents do not make the simple claim that complexity is evidence of design.") I pulled out one example from my own experience (one of several, but just the most easily linked) where an ID proponent (qualified enough to be an authorized writer on Dembski's blog) made that claim, refuting your absolute statement. It may be that the True ID Proponents don't espouse such troglodytic views, that they would never say "complexity proves ID" and instead say "a certain sort (irreducible, specified, etc.) of complexity proves ID," which is why I moved on to the link exposing the problems with "specified complexity" as Dembski skated around it, notably his misunderstanding of the examples he used, and his inability (or unwillingness) to provide any workable definition of what "specified complexity" is, and how we could objectively measure it.

Also, the person you linked to spoke of "biological complexity". He was *very* specific about the complexity he was referring to, not just any complexity we find in the world. I don't see anything in is his post, at a glance, that requires us to think that he meant complexity in general is evidence of design.

I linked to the first post in a long conversation, which turned (rather quickly) to discussion of Russian Quantum Physicists and SETI--i.e., information "complexity." PaV's argument, throughout, was that IDists, like SETI, can infer design simply by the complexity of the "signal," without any knowledge of the Designer or any outside comparison. As we said there, repeatedly, what SETI (and archaeologists, for that matter) look for is not complexity, but artificiality--significant difference from nature.

You also have a simplistic and immature understanding of the Intelligent Design claims. It is not simply that "it could not have evolved". It goes much deeper than that - but I will leave that for another time to keep this conversation more focussed.

That's okay, IDists have a simplistic and immature understanding of how the universe functions, so it's even.

I didn't claim to be able to explain precisely what specified complexity is. I was just pointing out that ID proponents (those who well represent it) distinguish between just general complexity and specified complexity. Whether there are issues with specified complexity, or in making this distinction, is an independent question.

So they make a distinction, but you don't know what the distinction is. And how do you know that the distinction is valid? That it has any merit? That it's based on anything measurable or quantifiable? That it's objective in any fashion? I could make the distinction between "left socks" and "unspecified socks" in my sock drawer, but it doesn't mean that such a distinction represents anything in reality.

Taking a look at Egnor's post, it seems to be much the same thing. He claims that "complexity" is not enough to demonstrate ID, but "design" is. It looks like he's claiming that anything with "purpose" must have been "designed" (it's muddy, I'll admit, and he doesn't give a decent definition, despite trying an argumentum ad Websterum), specifically DNA. Whether or not something has a "purpose" is not an objective standard of measurement, nor is it something that would be unique to designed objects. It's merely a rhetorical trick designed to support ID through language, since it isn't supported through evidence.

But let's move on, because I think I can kill two birds here with the same stone.

And my answer would be that given that specified complexity refers to complexity that is meaningful to a mind, it is going to be difficult - if not impossible - to pin down an exact definition that will allow us to perfectly distinguish.

Sounds like you're arguing backwards, which is basically what Egnor was doing with "design." Here's the rub: intelligent agents are capable of assigning meaning and ascribing purpose where none exists.

Take, for instance, one of the classic blunders of the Moon Landing Hoax crew. They have a picture of one of the astronauts on the moon, standing next to a rock that appears to have the letter "C" carved into it. This, they say, is proof that the rock was a prop, marked by some prop master, and placed in a specific spot on the set, though accidentally rotated so the prop designation letter was visible to the camera. They have seen a symbol that has meaning to the human mind, and have ascribed a purpose to it--namely, to keep track of the various props used on the moon landing set.

And here's where they went wrong: there's no letter "C" on the rock; it doesn't even exist in the original photos. What has happened is that an eyelash or hair of some sort was on the picture when it was copied, looking like a letter "C," but actually just being a curved line. They have seen "meaning" and "purpose" where none actually existed.

It's the same with the folks seeing Jesus in a grilled cheese sandwich and Mary in an underpass stain: human intelligence is largely built around the capacity to discern patterns and infer intent; the problem is that those abilities don't turn off, and often lead to false positives. We seek patterns or images in random sequences (pareidolia), and we assign intent and volition to things which possess none--the remnants of the same instincts which led us to see storms and earthquakes as remnants of the gods are the likely cause of us getting upset at computers and cars when they don't work correctly.

The point: complexity that is meaningful to a mind may not be inherent to the complex object. It may instead be inherent to the mind--i.e., it may be utterly subjective.

1. Being unable to pin down the definition exactly doesn't make it useless. We have plenty of phrases that defy a precise definition yet are still profoundly useful. I might refer to a "pile of sand", but then we might wonder how much sand is required to make something a pile? So too, there are clear cut cases where complexity is specified and where it is not.

Yes, having an uncertain definition may be useful in some cases. Having an uncertain definition at the core of your scientific hypothesis, however, is less useful. If you were claiming that a "pile of sand" has enough free energy to power a city, but a "heap of sand" does not, then you better be able to fairly specifically define the difference between the two, or be dismissed as having an unfalsifiable hypothesis.

In science, even if your definitions aren't crystal-clear, they ought to be objectively measurable. Speaking from a very charitable point of view, if "specified complexity" is evidence for a Designer, then the first step is not pointing out instances of specified complexity, but going to the lab or the drawing board to see if there is some objective metric, something actual, that separates "complexity" from "specified complexity."

2. Dembski's methods were never intended to distinguish perfectly between all cases of design and non-design. It was merely meant to be reliable when it does assert the presence of design. Plenty of design might slip through the net though. Plenty of cases of specified complexity might remain undetected. It was never claimed to be more than that.

I'm not asking for perfection, I'm asking for some measurable standard. Science doesn't have a problem with error; missing some hits and hitting some misses are part of the game. We recalibrate, tighten the controls, and try to refine our methodology. But before we can do any of that, there needs to be some set of measurable criteria by which we can distinguish between these two categories. "Meaningfulness" is entirely subjective.

I didn't claim it was anything inherent in the objects themselves. A painting might be beautiful. That doesn't mean the beauty is in the paint, the canvas, the frame or any of the matter it's composed out of. The beauty exists in the mind of the observer to whom that arrangement of matter is meaningful.

Thank you for so perfectly illustrating my point. You're right, "beauty" isn't an objective quantity that we can measure in the painting itself, it's a purely subjective quality that exists in the mind of the observer. Just like "meaningfulness."

This is what we are trying to detect - purposeful arrangement of matter by a mind. Not some inherent quality in the objects themselves.

And how can you do that without either knowledge of the mind who arranged the matter, or comparison to some objective standard of non-design? How do you, as an observer, distinguish between a Jackson Pollock and a canvas where a cat knocked over a bunch of cans of paint?

Specified Complexity and Irreducible Complexity are both attempts by IDists to create an arbitrary, objective metric by which to determine design. Neither one is based on a real, measurable quantity, just on ascribed "purpose" and "meaning."

And how is that a refutation of anything I claimed? How does this highlight any supposed categorical error you think I've made?

Is "specified complexity" something we can measure given only the "specified complex" object? If yes, then you're claiming that the "meaningfulness" or "design" is inherent to the object, which has not been shown to be the case; in fact, the opposite has been: that we distinguish "design" either by knowing the designer's purpose, or by discerning artificiality--difference from nature. If no, then it's an admission of precisely my point: that design is distinguishable from non-design only through comparison.

This is not the only way we distinguish design from non-design. That's just one way. ID doesn't claim to have *the* only way of detecting design, just one way, and an imperfect way.

You're right, I was mistaken in calling it the only way. The other way requires some knowledge of the designer.

When it detects design, it will always be correct - but sometimes it won't detect design when in fact there is design. Other methods might help in different scenarios.

I'm not certain that I'd claim it would always be correct. It may often be correct, but not necessarily always. I'd like to know what "other methods" you have.

I have no idea what your point is here. Are you meaning to beg the question, by supposing that the deer is not designed?

No, I mean to state the obvious, by showing that the deer is not artificial. We distinguish design from non-design by how it differs from nature around it and in general. Watches are very different compared to natural objects and structures; they are made of different materials, organized in different fashions, and so on. Deer and trees and grass, however, are not different from natural objects and structures; they are made of the same materials, organized in the same fashions, and so forth. It's why we describe one set of objects as "artificial" and one as "nature."

This is the very question we are discussing. You can't point to the deer as not designed, and expect me to say, "of course!"

No, I point to the deer as non-artificial, and unless we're in EPCOT Center and it's an animatronic deer, I expect you to say "of course!"

I look at the deer and see design. I distinguish between the deer and a rock, not the deer and a watch, where design is concerned.

And by what criteria do you make that distinction? What about the deer screams design, while the rock screams non-design?

Even Richard Dawkins sees the appearance of design in nature - don't you?

I think you misunderstand what Dawkins meant by "appearance"--he's saying that, to us, certain structures may appear (i.e., seem) to be designed. We may ascribe purpose to them, we may think "gosh, that's really complex," but the "appearance" of design in nature is much like the "appearance" of the Virgin Mary on a tortilla--it exists in the mind of the flawed human observer, not in the actual object.

In fact, your analogy is *extremely* poor. Suppose that the watch is designed by the watchmaker Frank from town. Suppose also that the deer is designed by God. We have here the deer in an environment designed by God - the grass, trees, flowers, insects, and so on. And then we have the watch - designed and built by Frank. It stands out not because one is designed and the other is not - rather because they have two different designers with different styles and intentions.

And my analogy was poor? How do you distinguish between the deer designed by God and the rock, apparently made-but-not-designed by God (according to your earlier statement)?

You're right, part of the reason that we can recognize that the watch is designed is because we are familiar with watches, and with the sort of intelligent agents which design and use watches. We have evidence of the existence of the agents who build watches, and we have other watches built by those agents to serve as comparisons. We know the general purpose of those watches, because we know the mind of the watchmaker, and his likely purpose in making that watch.

We don't know any of those things about the sort of being who might design trees and deer. We don't know that they exist, we don't know what purpose they have, and we don't have any examples of things we're sure they've designed, to compare to other objects. If nature is designed, then until we encounter the Designer and discover its purpose, or until we have some objective criteria for distinguishing design from non-design in nature (the way we distinguish design from non-design through artificiality--contrast with nature), then we have absolutely no way of knowing whether or not anything in nature is designed.

An analogy of this would be a server room full of computers, cables, air conditioners, etc - and then a toilet right in the middle of it. The toilet doesn't stand out because it alone was designed - but rather because it is out of place in the style and intention of the design - indeed even in the precision and complexity.

Yes, you're clearly so much better at analogy. Once again, the toilet stands out because it is significantly different from its surroundings (in terms of shape, composition, and complexity) and because we know something about the designer (the likely intended purpose of the servers and the toilet).

Naturally, you acknowledge this: "it is out of place in the style and intention of the design." We know it is out of place in style, because we compare it to the things around it. We know it is out of place in intent, because we know the mind of the Designer and what its intents were in designing these objects. Nature, however, is not out of place in nature. We don't know the mind of the nature-designer, primarily because we have no evidence of the nature-designer's existence. So, if the style's no different, and the intent is unknown, then how do we distinguish design?

The main point here is that your analogy doesn't beget only one explanation, and doesn't support your conclusion.

Then I suppose we have the same problem.

--Summer Glau

[pv]

I'm interested to know what qualifies the shysters of the fraudulently named Discovery Institute to pontificate more than anyone else about irreducible complexity. What is special about their qualifications? After all they neither conduct nor publish research, nor do the actually "discover" anything. All they seem to do is invent and make assertions about ID in an attempt to provide a post hoc explanation for their preferred religious delusion. What's more, in denying the connection between ID and their preferred religious delusion, they do seem to demonstrate ample talent for lying.
But of course they are lying for God, so that's alright then.

[bipolar2]

"God's only excuse is that he does not exist." -- Stendahl

[AndyD]

I'm sure this must have been asked before but is God complex (irreducibly complex, specifically complex) or is he simple? If he is complex then was he designed? If so, by whom? If not, then how is he both complex and yet undesigned? If he is simple, how did he design and create such complex things?

I recall some thirty-odd years ago, at eleven years old, having a teacher tell the class "See this blackboard duster? The felt and timber did not just happen to make a duster, someone made it. That's how we know the world was made by God and doesn't just exist."

I asked him "Who made God?" and he replied "Oh, he always existed." Any religious inclinations I'd had ended there.

[lostn]

[quote]I'm sure this must have been asked before but is God complex (irreducibly complex, specifically complex) or is he simple? If he is complex then was he designed? If so, by whom? If not, then how is he both complex and yet undesigned? If he is simple, how did he design and create such complex things?[/quote]

Regardless of who you ask, the answer always comes down to: Magic. God (or a designer) is magical, and is not bound by known laws of physics, likely because he exists outside of space and time, so the standard rules don't apply to him. In other words he's an exception.

We may as well just say everything that exists is due to magic.

And because we have no way of examining magic, therefore he the designer is beyond examination also. So don't ask questions. God did it, end of story. Which also means that Jesus was indeed born through a magical sperm that impregnated a virgin girl who happened to be married (poor Joseph), and died on a cross to be resurrected 3 days later. And that's that.

[King of Ferrets]

Lostn, the fact that I can't be 100% sure you're joking is kind of sad.

[lostn]

Hmm, perhaps I wasn't as clear as I should have been. That was sarcasm, but it is exactly what an apologist of ID would say. They'll leave out the Jesus bit of course, to sound quasi scientific, but that is their answer.

[Croath]

Dear Summer Glau,

I thought you reserved this appellation for times when you mercilessly destroy the credibility of your interlocutor both as a person able to formulate any thoughts and represent those thoughts in an intelligble way. As it is, your post is bereft of any real counter arguments, spelling or grammar corrections. It is instead a work of misunderstanding and perhaps hidden admissions.

Let's go back to the start - I came here to point out that the Intelligent Design movement, as it is best represented, does not make the simple and false claim that complexity is evidence of design. As it stands, this point is unrefuted. If you see anyone say this, you should point out to them kindly that they are not so well equipped to represent ID in its strongest form.

The problem in general with your response is an inability on your part to keep clearly in your mind the idea that there can be more than one method of detecting design. Just like there is more than one way to detect the presence of a house. Some methods work better than others in differing circumstances. So a lot of my response will involve pointing out to you false assumption when you make it. I know you said in your last post "You're right, I was mistaken in calling it the only way", but despite this admission, you still seem to make errors as though you do think it is claimed to be the only way.

Now I have problems with your method of responding. Though it may endear you to other fans of this site, it will prevent you from becoming a respected opponent of ID. To speak precisely, you attribute arguments to me that later on in the very same post I make clear I am not making. This uncharitable form will win you arguments in the sense that you will frustrate your opponent to the point where he gives up. But you won't achieve anything because you are right, or your reasons are compelling.

For example,

Ah, yes, I should have known that Bill Dembski, Discovery Institute fellow and major league ID proponent, would let totally unqualified people write guest posts about Intelligent Design on his blog about Intelligent Design, without correcting them. Silly me.

Here you seem to be claiming that I thought this other poster was not qualified, where I was in fact just making the general point that I don't have to defend every internet poster. Regarding this person specifically I said:

I don't see anything in is his post, at a glance, that requires us to think that he meant complexity in general is evidence of design.

So I did not claim that this person was mistaken or unqualified - that was very clear in my response. I merely said that I don't have to defend every claim made by someone who has favourable opinions about ID.

You even went on to say,

It may be that the True ID Proponents don't espouse such troglodytic views, that they would never say "complexity proves ID" and instead say "a certain sort (irreducible, specified, etc.) of complexity proves ID,"

Indicating that you understand the point I was making is a valid, and possibly true one. So we could have skipped all this nonsense around it.

Another example of you reiterating a point that I already answered later on, you say:

I could make the distinction between "left socks" and "unspecified socks" in my sock drawer, but it doesn't mean that such a distinction represents anything in reality.

Yet I had already said in my previous post that,

We have plenty of phrases that defy a precise definition yet are still profoundly useful. I might refer to a "pile of sand", but then we might wonder how much sand is required to make something a pile? So too, there are clear cut cases where complexity is specified and where it is not.

Maybe, for your sake, I should have made the point more explicit, so here it is: we are able with certain cases to say clearly "this is a pile of sand but that is not. This third collection, I cannot say, it is too borderline". What matters is that there are times when we can make such distinctions, not that we can make the distinctions in all cases. In the case of "left socks" and "unspecified socks" we can never explicitly for any cases when one falls into one category and another into the other. This point was implicit to my argument - but perhaps not clear enough for you. This is not a situation where counter-examples, like your socks scenario, are relevant.

Let me make this more explicit in another way for you. Let's say I make the statement "some dogs have no hair". I then show you a dog that has no hair. You respond by saying, "this third dog, it has hair!" That response is not relevant. We're only interested in the fact that there are some instances of the scenario I outlined, not that there are exceptions.

Let me press it home with another example of the point I was originally making. You might claim that humans and apes share a common ancestor that is not human or ape. Let's imagine we put all the generations, from that common ancestor, to your father, in a line. Then I ask you, starting with your father, then your grandfather, his father, and so on, to go down the line and tell me the point where that creature is no longer human. I think you would not be able to say clearly, but would rather indicate "somewhere around this stage". Does your inability to precisely pin down the definition of a human make the appellation useless? Of course not. And there are a myriad of cases like this in both science and our every day living that make the point trivial.

There are cases when we can clearly point and say "this is not specified complexity", such as leaves scatterred on the ground, and "that is specified complexity", such as the words in this post. Having troubling areas between does not make the concept useless or unhelpful, even to scientists.

Nevertheless, Demsbki defines specified complexity as being cases where we have a very high improbability that is yet easily described. A sequence of coin tosses showing HHHHHHHHHH is easy to describe as "10 heads in a row", whereas HTHHTTTHHT is not easily described. (Just a note on this, Intelligent Design does not attribute 10 heads in a row to design, this example is merely to illustrate a limited point - the simple explicability of specified patterns).

Now onto a point you make,

As we said there, repeatedly, what SETI (and archaeologists, for that matter) look for is not complexity, but artificiality--significant difference from nature.

I would be very interested to know how you define artificiality. I would suspect that the concept of specified complexity and artificiality are not contrary. Different, yes, and relevant to sometimes different cases. If we were to receive a signal from deep space that could be decoded into a video of an alien vista, that would be an example of specified complexity that indicates design. This does not mean that:
a) Specified complexity is the only indicator of design
b) Artificiality is the only indicator of design
c) SETI actually uses specified complexity like the way it did in the movie Contact
d) SETI needs to use specified complexity for that to be valid
It is a mistake for you to say that just because SETI looks for artificiality that this is the only way design can be detected. My understanding is that the movie Contact is used by ID proponents because it involved celebration for discovering a signal which encoded primary numbers in it. That still works effectively as an example of design being detected via specified complexity. It doesn't matter whether SETI proper looks for such complexity or not. It's sufficient to note that such specified complexity, when found, does in fact indicate design. On this point, in the book "The Design of Life", Dembski argues that the artificiality which SETI pursues is in fact a case of specified complexity, but I indicate this merely as a curiosity. It's not at all essential to my point.

Now moving down to where you think you make a telling point, but really just miss the purpose of ID,

Here's the rub: intelligent agents are capable of assigning meaning and ascribing purpose where none exists.

And then you go on to outline carefully the obvious - that we can sometimes see design when in fact we have chance.

As I said before, your understanding of ID claims is rudimentary, and here it is outlined well. There are two points I want to drive home carefully:
1. Intelligent Design, at least Dembski's Explanatory Filter, does not claim to be able to catch every instance of design, but just that when it does catch it, it is never a false positive
2. Intelligent Design is not intended to be the only means of detecting design

Now I know I've made these points before in this post, but I'm going to take the opportunity to reiterate them so that hopefully you, and others reading, will understand them. William Dembski calculated his own estimate of the universal probability bound to be 1 in 10^150. Anything that exceeds this should be called "impossible". Demsbki was not the first person to propose a value for this, but last I heard, his was the most generous. Now there are two important things to note from this:
1. An event with a probability of less than 1 in 10^150 should be considered impossible precisely because it is so improbable. We should not expect to get any false positives given such probabilities.
2. There will be *many* design events that will slip through a net this small. Tossing a coin 10 times in a row, and getting heads, might in fact be the product of a coin with heads on both sides. But the probability of this is 1 in 2^10. Not very improbable, and therefore William Dembski's method would miss this.

So the reason why your telling point misses the mark should be quite obvious now. Yes, we might mistakenly see design in the cases you outlined, but these cases would be missed by Dembski's filter anyway. His design filter was not meant to catch all cases of design, but it was meant to be always right when it says it has design.

Now we head into murky waters,

And how can you do that without either knowledge of the mind who arranged the matter, or comparison to some objective standard of non-design? How do you, as an observer, distinguish between a Jackson Pollock and a canvas where a cat knocked over a bunch of cans of paint?

Suppose we go to another world and discover a sphere made of titanium, and we can see images that appear engraved on the surface showing mountains and oceans. When we move to within one meter of the presence of this sphere, we find in our mind's eye a compelling and lucid tour of the world on which we have arrived, flying past mountains at top speeds, diving to the ocean depths. Then suddenly it ends. When others approach it they report the same experience.

We have no need of any knowledge of the designer, their intentions, or their means, to attribute design. Why would you think we do?

I do not know what you mean by "some objective standard of non-design".

As for the Jackson Pollock and cat scenario, I point you back to earlier in this post where I make the point about Intelligent Design dealing with the highly improbable and obvious cases of design. We do not need to be able to distinguish all cases of design from non-design with one method. I don't know that the ID method can be used in this scenario, so I don't see the relevance.

that design is distinguishable from non-design only through comparison.

I would probably agree with this depending on how you define your terms. Obviously design will always be measured, in some way or another, to an intelligence. Eg, a murder made to look like an accident will accord to the intentions of the villain. An irreducibly complex system only finds its origins at the hands of an intelligent designer, so again we compare it to the kinds of works a designer produces vs chance or law.

If you understand these things the same way as me, then I see no tension between what you claim and the claims of ID.

I'm not certain that I'd claim it would always be correct. It may often be correct, but not necessarily always. I'd like to know what "other methods" you have.

I'm not sure why it's relevant, but I'll indulge. One method for detecting design I have besides the Intelligent Design method is the accordance of events to someone's statements of what they intend. Eg, someone says to me "I intend to arrange our backyard to look like a dry desert". I then go to their house a few weeks later and see that their backyard has changed since I last saw it, and now looks like a dry desert. I detect design because it accords with what I heard an intelligent designer announce they planned to do, and so it makes that probability much higher than that of chance.

It's not perfect, but it's served me well. The ID methods are meant to be much more precise - that when they get a positive, they're always right. But they miss a lot in the process.

No, I mean to state the obvious, by showing that the deer is not artificial.

I'm sorry, but this is in fact begging the question. If the ID guys are right, then the deer is artificial (pending the release of your definition of artificial). You haven't demonstrated the deer is not artificial, this is the very thing in question. And thus, when you say,

We distinguish design from non-design by how it differs from nature around it and in general.

you are asserting more than you are entitled to.

Watches are very different compared to natural objects and structures; they are made of different materials, organized in different fashions, and so on. Deer and trees and grass, however, are not different from natural objects and structures; they are made of the same materials, organized in the same fashions, and so forth. It's why we describe one set of objects as "artificial" and one as "nature."

Here you aren't leaning on any concrete reasons, but just depending on the ambiguity of terms like "nature". I already agreed with you that watches are very different in those ways from the other set of things that includes deer, trees and grass. Nature, however, can itself be divided further - for example between living and non-living matter. And I just here say there is clear design in living nature, but it's not at all clearly evidenced in non-living nature. There isn't anything here at all in your argument to say that the watch is artificial yet the deer is not (if we define artificial as, say, not occuring by natural law or chance).

And by what criteria do you make that distinction? What about the deer screams design, while the rock screams non-design?

I confess to not understanding how you can ask this question and not see the answer yourself. As I quoted earlier, Dawkins himself said that life has the appearance of design (and I'll get to your comment on this soon). The Deer shows many traits of design, but in particular contains irreducibly complex systems. Francis Crick said that biologists must constantly remind themselves that what they see is not designed. So I don't understand how you can ask "what about the deer screams design". This is a common reaction of people who are introduced to the complexity of life.

The rock shows no signs of design. This does not mean the rock is not designed (such as a prop with the letter C on it). It's just I have no reason to think that it is.

I think you misunderstand what Dawkins meant by "appearance"--he's saying that, to us, certain structures may appear (i.e., seem)

I didn't misunderstand. I was saying that, even if you don't think deer are designed, they at least have the appearance, or seemingness, of being designed. I don't know what you thought I meant.

You're right, part of the reason that we can recognize that the watch is designed is because we are familiar with watches, and with the sort of intelligent agents which design and use watches...We don't know any of those things about the sort of being who might design trees and deer.

This is again irrelevant. All you're making is the trivial observation that this one method we have to detect design (being familiar with watches) does not work in another case (where we are not familiar). That says nothing about the Intelligent Design arguments. You're again assuming that there can only be one method for detecting design, which is false.

What is most worrying is the direction your argument, what you think is reasonable. Here's what I mean, and your comment to frame the discussion:

If nature is designed, then until we encounter the Designer and discover its purpose, or until we have some objective criteria for distinguishing design from non-design in nature (the way we distinguish design from non-design through artificiality--contrast with nature), then we have absolutely no way of knowing whether or not anything in nature is designed.

You here say "some objective criteria for distinguishing design from non-design in nature", this is exactly what ID is trying to achieve. I worry about how much you are trying to achieve. It seems, if your arguments are successful, that even *if* we grant that an intelligent designer created life on earth, science would not be able to learn anything about it. That despite the cold hard fact that life was designed, we can never know it. And that's just absurd to say that it's beyond the reach of science. More importantly, if you think that science would be incapable of detecting design even if it were present, then surely we should refrain from opinion as to whether life was designed or not - rather than committing to a naturalistic explanation of it.

Yes, you're clearly so much better at analogy. Once again, the toilet stands out because it is significantly different from its surroundings (in terms of shape, composition, and complexity) and because we know something about the designer (the likely intended purpose of the servers and the toilet).

Hold on a moment here. Why is this relevant? I was criticising your conclusion that we distinguish between the watch and the deer because one is designed and the other was not. Prior to Darwin, the popular opinion was that the deer is designed. Yet even then they were able to distinguish between the two. So why do you think I'd disagree about your reasons *why* we can distinguish? The point was that the distinction can be made in more than one way.

To talk about our knowledge of the designer and their intended purpose is irrelevant to the point I was making. Moreover, even if it *were* relevant, we are still able to claim that we have ideas what the intention of a designer of grass, trees and deer was - the Bible account gives one such attempt to explain the intentions of the designer. So you fail here too in supposing we see no intention in the deer.

My analagy was perfectly suited to the point I wanted to make. Clearly I am so much better at analogy than you.

Just to let you know upfront, I probably won't remember to check back here to see if there's any responses. Thanks for your time.

[Tom Foss]

Let's go back to the start - I came here to point out that the Intelligent Design movement, as it is best represented, does not make the simple and false claim that complexity is evidence of design. As it stands, this point is unrefuted.

Ah, I see, no true IDist would make such a claim. And anyone who does, well, that's not a true IDist. It's all so clear now.

IDists throw around terms like "specified complexity" and "irreducible complexity" to get around precisely what you're saying--the fact that "complexity alone" would be an idiotic gauge for any concept. The problem is that neither "specified" nor "irreducible" complexity has been defined in a measurable way; we often hear (true or otherwise) IDists say that the eye/flagellum/clotting system is "too complex" to have evolved through natural selection, which suggests that there is some kind of barrier, a level or type of complexity, beyond which natural causes cannot reach. Until they give that barrier a definition, until they develop a testable hypothesis with regard to their claims of "[special type] complexity," it remains special pleading and appeal to personal incredulity.

The problem in general with your response is an inability on your part to keep clearly in your mind the idea that there can be more than one method of detecting design. Just like there is more than one way to detect the presence of a house.

The analogy master returns. What, pray tell, are the ways of detecting design which do not rely on comparison or prior knowledge of the designer?

Now I have problems with your method of responding. Though it may endear you to other fans of this site, it will prevent you from becoming a respected opponent of ID.

That's okay, I don't ask for their respect. In fact, if I were gaining the respect of the crowd of liars, charlatans, crybabies, idiots, and anti-science Luddites at the Discovery Institute and its affiliates, I'd think I was doing something terribly wrong. They respect neither science nor the scientific method, they respect neither the intelligence of the American populace nor the importance of examining reality as it is, so I guess I'm in good company.

o speak precisely, you attribute arguments to me that later on in the very same post I make clear I am not making.

If that's the case, then I apologize. But I reserve judgment until I see your claims.

But you won't achieve anything because you are right, or your reasons are compelling.

Ah, the Discovery Institute motto.

Here you seem to be claiming that I thought this other poster was not qualified, where I was in fact just making the general point that I don't have to defend every internet poster.

Funny, this is what you actually said:

You could have reasonably taken my claim to be refering to those qualified to represent Intelligent Design - such as the Discovery Institute. Instead you thought I was speaking on behalf of every internet poster with an opinion favourable to ID.

Emphasis added. You begin by saying that I should have taken your claim to mean that you were talking about those who were qualified to speak on ID, then you said "instead" (suggesting that I was not doing as you said I should in your first sentence) and talked about "every internet poster with an opinion favourable to ID." Now, I don't think I'm wrong in seeing the very clear implication that the "internet poster" was not "qualified to speak on ID."

And, as I said before, I wasn't talking about "every internet poster," I was talking about a single internet poster (in this instance) who authored posts about ID on Bill Dembski's ID blog. If that's not "qualified," then Dembski ought to have higher standards.

So I did not claim that this person was mistaken or unqualified - that was very clear in my response. I merely said that I don't have to defend every claim made by someone who has favourable opinions about ID.

I think your claim that the person was unqualified is clear. But I wasn't asking you to defend every claim made by people friendly to ID, I was refuting your "no IDist says complexity is proof of design" with an IDist who did. I'm not asking you to defend that person, I'm just demonstrating that your absolutist claim, even with the qualifier of "qualified," was incorrect.

Indicating that you understand the point I was making is a valid, and possibly true one. So we could have skipped all this nonsense around it.

No, actually, it wasn't. Perhaps I wasn't obvious enough with capitalizing "True ID Proponents," but I was accusing you of a No True Scotsman fallacy. You claim that No ID proponent would make Claim X, I show you an ID proponent who makes Claim X, and you say, 'well, no qualified ID proponent would say that.' Far from being a valid point, it's a classically fallacious one.

Maybe, for your sake, I should have made the point more explicit, so here it is: we are able with certain cases to say clearly "this is a pile of sand but that is not. This third collection, I cannot say, it is too borderline". What matters is that there are times when we can make such distinctions, not that we can make the distinctions in all cases. In the case of "left socks" and "unspecified socks" we can never explicitly for any cases when one falls into one category and another into the other. This point was implicit to my argument - but perhaps not clear enough for you. This is not a situation where counter-examples, like your socks scenario, are relevant.

And my point, with the socks example and the "pile/heap of sand" example, is that when you make a distinction between two things, such a distinction is meaningless unless it represents some aspect of reality. If I am presented with two otherwise identical socks or mounds of sand, and I say "this one is a left sock, and this is an unspecified sock," or "this is a pile of sand, but this is a heap of sand," I should be able to give some explanation of why I made those distinctions (and those distinctions should hold up under testing). If I can't explain the distinctions, or if my distinctions fail under a test, then we can reasonably conclude that my distinctions do not represent a quality which exists outside of my mind.

But I think the argument from analogy has derailed at this point, so let me bring it back to ID. We may be able to look at some organ, say the eye, and say "this is complex," and then look at something like a hydrogen atom and say "this is not complex" (though even then, that distinction is fairly arbitrary), which is akin to looking at a mound of sand grains and calling it a "pile of sand," and looking at an empty spot on the floor and calling it "not a pile of sand." Vague definitions may be useful with regard to such binary distinctions.

What ID is doing, however, is not a binary distinction; instead, they look at certain structures and call them "specified/irreducibly complex," while other structures may be complex, but not in those special ways. In this case, there needs to be a much more specific definition, which needs in turn to be based on objective, observable, real qualities of the objects being examined. Otherwise, it becomes the same as making the distinction between "left" and "unspecified" socks, where any difference between the two is either purely subjective or purely arbitrary.

Vague "I know it when I see it" distinctions may be good enough for obscenity judgments in court; they aren't good enough for science. The definitions and distinctions must at least be specific enough to be testable and falsifiable; so far, I have seen no such definition for "specified complexity;" on the other hand, "irreducible complexity" is fairly specific, but relies on a flawed understanding of how evolution works, and can be explained through far more parsimonious mechanisms than "goddidit."

Let me press it home with another example of the point I was originally making. You might claim that humans and apes share a common ancestor that is not human or ape.

Why would I make that claim? It's not true. Humans are apes. "Apes," or more specifically, "great apes" is a collective term for members of the Hominidae family, to which we belong. I might, however, say that "humans and monkeys share a common ancestor which is neither human nor monkey." Carry on.

Then I ask you, starting with your father, then your grandfather, his father, and so on, to go down the line and tell me the point where that creature is no longer human. I think you would not be able to say clearly, but would rather indicate "somewhere around this stage". Does your inability to precisely pin down the definition of a human make the appellation useless? Of course not.

The difference being that there are defining characteristics of Homo sapiens, which allow differentiation even from other members of the Homo genus, let alone other members of other families. You're right, I might not be able to draw a line and say "on this side, human, on this side, not." But I could use the specific defining characteristics of humans and the specific defining characteristics of our ancestors and cousins and whatnot, to come pretty close.

The possibility (in fact, a likely probability) is that there would be some generation(s) where making a distinction between "human" and "nonhuman" (or even between "homo sapiens" and the direct ancestor species) would be as arbitrary as making a distinction between left and unspecified socks. One might be able to say "on this side is H. erectus (or whichever species is the specific ancestor), due to these features. On this side is H. sapiens, due to these features. These generations in between, however, cannot be definitively classified one or the other."

Once again, if the distinction you're making doesn't represent a feature of nature, then it's utterly arbitrary and subjective.

The problem with the definition of "specified complexity" (for instance) is that it breaks down immediately, not just at certain fuzzy levels of reality. It lacks any degree of specificity beyond "I knows it when I sees it." If the definition of "human" were "I knows it when I sees it," then we'd be utterly unable to study the other hominids for what they are.

There are cases when we can clearly point and say "this is not specified complexity", such as leaves scatterred on the ground, and "that is specified complexity", such as the words in this post. Having troubling areas between does not make the concept useless or unhelpful, even to scientists.

And what's the definition that allows you to make that distinction? On what objective characteristics is that distinction based?

Nevertheless, Demsbki defines specified complexity as being cases where we have a very high improbability that is yet easily described.

Define "very high improbability" and "easily described." And how does this relate to biology, since you admit that the analogy doesn't?

I would be very interested to know how you define artificiality.

"Difference from nature," as I already said. There are other features that SETI looks for as well (based on hypotheses about the transmitters), but as far as artificiality goes, that's pretty much what it boils down to. But don't take my word for it, here's what SETI has to say:

If SETI were to announce that we’re not alone because it had detected a signal, it would be on the basis of artificiality. An endless, sinusoidal signal – adead simple tone – is not complex; it’s artificial. Such a tone just doesn’t seem to be generated by natural astrophysical processes. In addition, and unlike other radio emissions produced by the cosmos, such a signal is devoid of the appendages and inefficiencies nature always seems to add – for example, DNA’s junk and redundancy.

It's sufficient to note that such specified complexity, when found, does in fact indicate design.

...except when it doesn't. Sure looks like you're bootstrapping "idealized unrealistic fictional example of using specified complexity to indicate design" to conclude "all specified complexity indicates design." With regard to the "decoded alien video," in order to detect it, we'd first have to compare it to natural signals, from which it would have to differ, or we'd discard it as noise. In order to decode it, we'd have to know something about how it was encoded--i.e., the process by which it was designed. Long before we'd reach the "specified complexity," we would have already had to use other methods to determine that it was of intelligent origin.

If, instead, we searched through all the natural signals, looking for something that could be decoded, chances are we'd find all sorts of things that appeared to be snippets of signals or patterns or whatnot--things that appeared to be designed, but weren't. It'd be radio pareidolia, the SETI equivalent of seeing Jesus in a grilled cheese sandwich.

On this point, in the book "The Design of Life", Dembski argues that the artificiality which SETI pursues is in fact a case of specified complexity, but I indicate this merely as a curiosity. It's not at all essential to my point.

That's good, because Dembski is wrong, and Contact depicts an unrealistic scenario.

As I said before, your understanding of ID claims is rudimentary, and here it is outlined well.

Ah, the Courtier's reply. You keep saying that, yet not offering anything which changes my understanding of ID.

1. Intelligent Design, at least Dembski's Explanatory Filter, does not claim to be able to catch every instance of design, but just that when it does catch it, it is never a false positive

And how does it screen out false positives?

2. Intelligent Design is not intended to be the only means of detecting design

As far as I can tell, it's not even a useful means of detecting design; if you're any indication, then it merely stretches the word "design" to mean "anything biological," thus robbing it of any explanatory power.

William Dembski calculated his own estimate of the universal probability bound to be 1 in 10^150. Anything that exceeds this should be called "impossible".

By what criteria did he make this distinction? Why should anything be categorically labeled as "impossible"? That's not a scientific distinction.

1. An event with a probability of less than 1 in 10^150 should be considered impossible precisely because it is so improbable. We should not expect to get any false positives given such probabilities.

And this would only be useful in a system operating on pure chance and a time frame limited enough that a 1 in 10^150 chance wouldn't be an inevitability.

Even so, this is a ridiculous assumption. If I had a 10^151-sided die, this would suggest that the probability of landing on any one side would be so low as to render it impossible. Thus, the die could never land on any side. While a 10^151-sided die would be an improbable creation (it'd have to be pretty large to differentiate it from a sphere), it certainly wouldn't be impossible. Heck, I bet we could create a virtual one with no problem whatsoever.

2. There will be *many* design events that will slip through a net this small. Tossing a coin 10 times in a row, and getting heads, might in fact be the product of a coin with heads on both sides. But the probability of this is 1 in 2^10. Not very improbable, and therefore William Dembski's method would miss this.

I thought you said that getting head 10 times in a row wasn't an example of design. Again, this is all utterly meaningless except in a system that operates according to pure chance.

So the reason why your telling point misses the mark should be quite obvious now. Yes, we might mistakenly see design in the cases you outlined, but these cases would be missed by Dembski's filter anyway. His design filter was not meant to catch all cases of design, but it was meant to be always right when it says it has design.

Except that such a filter cannot detect design in any chemical or biological process, since they don't operate according to pure chance. They operate according to mechanistic laws, which significantly alter the accuracy of probability determinations. That's a large part of why Fred Hoyle's 747 analogy falls apart: biological systems don't assemble according to random chance.

We have no need of any knowledge of the designer, their intentions, or their means, to attribute design. Why would you think we do?

Because such an experience differs from our normal experience. And because it's apparently not a world made entirely of titanium spheres with recognizable engravings on them (and even that would stand out in a universe where engraved titanium spheres were a rarity).

So, yet again, we determine design by comparing it to nature, in this case, to our natural experiences.

I do not know what you mean by "some objective standard of non-design".

Clearly. It's exactly what I've been saying since the beginning: to determine design, you need either a point of comparison (something that was not designed) or knowledge of the designer relevant to how the object was designed or likely to be designed.

As for the Jackson Pollock and cat scenario, I point you back to earlier in this post where I make the point about Intelligent Design dealing with the highly improbable and obvious cases of design.

Except that many of the things which Intelligent Design claims are designed aren't obvious. That the eye was designed is not "obvious," that a bacterial flagellum could have evolved is not "improbable." These are utterly arbitrary distinctions, based on no evidence and no qualities of reality.

Obviously design will always be measured, in some way or another, to an intelligence.

So in order for you to claim that biological features are designed, you first have to prove that there is a designer.

Incidentally, I disagree with your phrasing there; design will always be measured according to knowledge of a designer or difference from its natural surroundings.

An irreducibly complex system only finds its origins at the hands of an intelligent designer, so again we compare it to the kinds of works a designer produces vs chance or law.

Except that every system and feature which has been described as "irreducibly complex" can be explained perfectly through evolutionary processes. It is not a useful determinant of design; it relies on a flawed understanding of evolution (that structures are assembled piece by piece toward one specific purpose; that "partial" structures are not useful). It is not an indicator of design, it is an indicator of someone who misunderstands how biology works.

I detect design because it accords with what I heard an intelligent designer announce they planned to do, and so it makes that probability much higher than that of chance.

So in other words, you needed knowledge of the designer in order to detect design. Incidentally, had you not known your neighbor's intentions, you might notice that his dry, desert lawn is bounded on all sides by distinct property lines, separating it from the green grass and clover and dirt of the other neighboring lawns. You might then rightly think "I wonder what my neighbor did to his lawn," since it is so different from the surrounding lawns.

Gosh, all that sounds vaguely familiar...

I'm sorry, but this is in fact begging the question. If the ID guys are right, then the deer is artificial (pending the release of your definition of artificial).

No, the deer is not artificial. It does not differ markedly from the nature around it.

Here you aren't leaning on any concrete reasons, but just depending on the ambiguity of terms like "nature".

How is "nature" an ambiguous term?

And I just here say there is clear design in living nature, but it's not at all clearly evidenced in non-living nature.

And I disagree. What is "clear design" in nature, and how do you distinguish that from "non-design" in nature? Or are you merely claiming that all living matter is designed? In that case, you've merely redefined what "designed" means, and have robbed it of any explanatory power.

I confess to not understanding how you can ask this question and not see the answer yourself. As I quoted earlier, Dawkins himself said that life has the appearance of design (and I'll get to your comment on this soon).

Yes, and in the next clause he calls it the "illusion of design." If you can't see how the appearance of design can occur in non-living matter, then your re-definition of "design" is more ridiculous than originally thought. I can see complex geometric patterns in snowflakes; why don't those have the "appearance of design"? I can see geometric patterns in crystals and various sorts of rocks; why wouldn't that be an "appearance of design"? What differentiates the jewels in an earring from those in a geode or another crystal-forming rock? If I walk along the stream and find a very round, very flat rock on the riverbed, might I not conclude, based on your same criteria, that it was perfectly designed for skipping across water?

If you're going to claim that living matter has "obvious" signs of design, then why not non-living matter? Why not see the "obvious" signs of design that the ancients saw in the sky, naming clusters of stars after the things they were clearly designed to resemble?

The Deer shows many traits of design, but in particular contains irreducibly complex systems.

Which can be explained quite easily without a designer. The fact that you continue to cite this suggests that you haven't looked at all at the scientific literature, and that you haven't learned at all from the mistakes of folks like Mike Behe at the Dover trial. That may endear you to your creationist pals, but it won't make you a respected opponent of actual science.

Francis Crick said that biologists must constantly remind themselves that what they see is not designed.

I'd say this is good advice for any human being prone to pareidolia (and I realize that's redundant). Yes, we must all constantly remind ourselves that things which may appear to be meaningful patterns often aren't. Moreover, Crick's specialization was in molecular biology, examining nonliving matter like DNA molecules and proteins. So this really doesn't support your point at all.

Not to mention that the quote you're mining is from Crick's 1988 book, toward the end of his belief in directed panspermia. The discovery of ribozymes led him to re-evaluate directed panspermia, since that discovery would make abiogenesis much more easily imagined.

This is again irrelevant. All you're making is the trivial observation that this one method we have to detect design (being familiar with watches) does not work in another case (where we are not familiar). That says nothing about the Intelligent Design arguments. You're again assuming that there can only be one method for detecting design, which is false.

No, I'm demonstrating that we have two ways of detecting design: comparison with nature, and knowledge of how the designer works. You have been able to provide no other method to determine design in the real world; your only mechanisms are a useless probability metric (which would be great if biology and chemistry operated on chance, but they don't) and the "obvious" appearance of design, which is utterly subjective, arbitrary (why living, but not non-living? Does it apply to DNA? DNA is non-living matter) and unscientific.

You here say "some objective criteria for distinguishing design from non-design in nature", this is exactly what ID is trying to achieve.

No, it's exactly what ID initially assumes, along with the existence of some designer. You can't start with the conclusion and work backwards; you have to start with observation.

It seems, if your arguments are successful, that even *if* we grant that an intelligent designer created life on earth, science would not be able to learn anything about it.

Actually, that's one of scientists' main complaints about Intelligent Design. Even if we grant that some biological features are designed, what does that tell us? What predictions can that make? What experiments does that suggest? So far, bupkis. Even if we grant the main premise of ID, it does absolutely nothing to further our understanding about the natural world. Contrast this with evolutionary theory, which makes myriad predictions: where transitional fossils are likely to be found and what they will look like, how known selection pressures may affect populations, etc.

That despite the cold hard fact that life was designed, we can never know it.

Not without something to measure it by. It's pretty much the same as Last Thursdayism: the universe could have been created in media res last Thursday, with the illusion of being billions of years old, with all our memories implanted, and we'd never know. Science can only determine what the evidence says is the case. And in the case of biology, the evidence testifies to descent with modification from a common ancestor.

More importantly, if you think that science would be incapable of detecting design even if it were present, then surely we should refrain from opinion as to whether life was designed or not - rather than committing to a naturalistic explanation of it.

No, surely we should accept the null hypothesis until the evidence suggests otherwise. Because that's how science works.

But you seem to be operating on the assumption that there's no evidence to contradict the claim that life was designed, when in fact there is ample evidence. Not only can "irreducible complexity" be reduced, not only can purpose be explained through natural selection, but all the physical evidence, from fossils to genes to morphology, points to an unbroken line of descent with modification through random mutation and nonrandom natural selection. The so-called "appearance of design" is a function not of reality, but of the tendencies of the human brain, which assigns patterns and purposes and meanings where none exist.

If ID wants to claim design in nature, they have to start with some observation, or some testable hypothesis, not with the conclusion.

I was criticising your conclusion that we distinguish between the watch and the deer because one is designed and the other was not.

And, as I said before, that's not the conclusion that I made. My conclusion had absolutely nothing to do with design, and everything to do with artificiality (and, subsequently, with knowledge of the designer). Paley's conclusion was "Design," and Paley's conclusion was based on false premises.

Prior to Darwin, the popular opinion was that the deer is designed. Yet even then they were able to distinguish between the two.

Because the reason for the distinction didn't change due to Darwin. The distinction has to do with the fact that the deer and the watch are different.

So why do you think I'd disagree about your reasons *why* we can distinguish? The point was that the distinction can be made in more than one way.

And my point is that you haven't offered any way to make the distinction that doesn't rely on subjective assumptions or redefined words.

Moreover, even if it *were* relevant, we are still able to claim that we have ideas what the intention of a designer of grass, trees and deer was - the Bible account gives one such attempt to explain the intentions of the designer. So you fail here too in supposing we see no intention in the deer.

No, here you fail in (again) assuming your conclusion. If we had prior knowledge of a Designer's existence, and prior knowledge of how the Designer worked, we might be able to distinguish whether or not a natural object was designed. We have no such prior knowledge, because there is no evidence for the Designer, and there is no evidence that the Bible accurately describes reality (and plenty of evidence that it doesn't). Similarly, there is no criteria for distinguishing "design" from "non-design" in nature that represents any real quality. Instead, you have to make arbitrary distinctions (between "living" and "non-living" matter) or subjective judgments, neither of which are based on verifiable observation, and thus, neither of which is science.

My analagy was perfectly suited to the point I wanted to make. Clearly I am so much better at analogy than you.

No, your analogies have been about as suited to your points as a toilet in a server room. When they've fit your points at all, they've illustrated my points better than yours.

Incidentally, your arguments have had something else in common with a toilet, but I'll let you make that distinction.

[Skemono]

William Dembski calculated his own estimate of the universal probability bound to be 1 in 10^150. Anything that exceeds this should be called "impossible". Demsbki was not the first person to propose a value for this, but last I heard, his was the most generous. Now there are two important things to note from this:
1. An event with a probability of less than 1 in 10^150 should be considered impossible precisely because it is so improbable.

Ah yes. Ye olde argument from big numbers fallacy.

[Techskeptic]

The ID methods are meant to be much more precise - that when they get a positive, they're always right.

and you know this....how? I read your long post and you keep claiming this, without a single link as to how you know this. Was there an experiment?

I can imagine the experiment..

Thing..............filter.......Dembski
corkscrew..........Designed....."Right!"
Pebble.............Not-designed."Right!"
Picasso painting...designed....."Right!"
Cat................designed....."Right!"

Dembski, "See? my filter always detects design!".

Ok, I had the site open still this morning and refreshed. Very frustrating.

Ah, I see, no true IDist would make such a claim. And anyone who does, well, that's not a true IDist. It's all so clear now.

Here you continue your irrational, thoughtless, and completely uncharitable approach of attributing arguments you already know I reject. Your own words:

It may be that the True ID Proponents don't espouse such troglodytic views, that they would never say "complexity proves ID" and instead say "a certain sort (irreducible, specified, etc.) of complexity proves ID,"

So why have you returned again to this argument which you already acknowledged was possibly not true? You ought to be embarassed.

Until they give that barrier a definition, until they develop a testable hypothesis with regard to their claims of "[special type] complexity," it remains special pleading and appeal to personal incredulity.

Are you willfully ignorant, or do you just play the fool in the hopes that your opponents won't point it out? I already provided analogies that counter this, for example, your ability to pin down where homo sapients end and our ancestor species begins. There are definitions and explanations for specified complexity. They are not able to be applied precisely to all cases, but that doesn't matter! I provided a counterexample to your ridiculous assertion, and you are yet to demonstrate otherwise.

The analogy master returns. What, pray tell, are the ways of detecting design which do not rely on comparison or prior knowledge of the designer?

And again you play the fool, a role you seem quite adept at. I already said, in response to your claim "that design is distinguishable from non-design only through comparison", by saying:

I would probably agree with this depending on how you define your terms. Obviously design will always be measured, in some way or another, to an intelligence. Eg, a murder made to look like an accident will accord to the intentions of the villain. An irreducibly complex system only finds its origins at the hands of an intelligent designer, so again we compare it to the kinds of works a designer produces vs chance or law.

If you understand these things the same way as me, then I see no tension between what you claim and the claims of ID.

Moving on...

And, as I said before, I wasn't talking about "every internet poster," I was talking about a single internet poster (in this instance) who authored posts about ID on Bill Dembski's ID blog. If that's not "qualified," then Dembski ought to have higher standards.

Oh really? Let's see what *you* wrote:

On the contrary, I have seen many make that claim. Here, for instance. The whole of ID is built upon variants of the "X is so complex that it could not have evolved" argument from personal ignorance.

There are two nuggets you say that required responding to:
1. "many make that claim" - I responded by pointing out that I am not required to defend every point made by "the many" supporters of ID
2. That this specific person is an example of the many ("Here, for instance") - I responded by pointing out that this person didn't make the error you attributed to them. And given your tactics debating with me so far, I seriously doubt your ability to accurately represent your opponents viewpoints. So I did not criticise this person's ability to represent ID.

I was right in my response, you were wrong in your critique of it.

I was accusing you of a No True Scotsman fallacy. You claim that No ID proponent would make Claim X, I show you an ID proponent who makes Claim X, and you say, 'well, no qualified ID proponent would say that.'

And I answered this criticism right at the start by saying that the person in question didn't make the error you attributed to them! Can't you remember anything? I didn't know they were a trusted blogger on Demsbki's site at the time I wrote that he didn't make that error. I defended him, not even knowing he was more eminently qualified than others. So I didn't make this error you attribute to me! It's all there in this page's history - just go have a look.

Your inability to separate the two points I made, despite me clearing them up, is staggering.

But I could use the specific defining characteristics of humans and the specific defining characteristics of our ancestors and cousins and whatnot, to come pretty close.

Precisely my point. Now I would make another point here about your lack of a precise measurement for saying "this definition is precise enough to be useful, but that definition is too vauge", and point out the regress - but I fear the point would be lost on you, so I'll leave it at that. Now that we've established that my point about the piles of sand, and the definition of homo sapien, are relevant, let me provide for you an explanation of specified complexity.

I know it's quite long - but having demolished your argument that an imprecise definition is a problem, I can now give it to you.

With regard to the "decoded alien video," in order to detect it, we'd first have to compare it to natural signals, from which it would have to differ, or we'd discard it as noise. In order to decode it, we'd have to know something about how it was encoded--i.e., the process by which it was designed.

1. Comparison is not a problem with the ID theory - I already pointed out in my last reply that specified complexity, as I understand it, involves comparison. So your point, whatever it's against, is not against ID
2. To decode it we don't need to know in advance how it was encoded - we reverse engineer communications already. If there is a new method of encoding, we don't need to know the process by which that was designed in order to begin the task of decoding it. Sure, that would make it easier. But it's not necessary! We can still discover it with just the encoded video, via clever tricks or brute force

You have locked in your head that there is this o